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Selecting Forecasting Methods
Abstract
I examined six ways of selecting forecasting methods: Convenience, “what’s easy,” is inexpensive, but
risky. Market popularity, “what others do,” sounds appealing but is unlikely to be of value because
popularity and success may not be related and because it overlooks some methods. Structured judgment,
“what experts advise,” which is to rate methods against prespecified criteria, is promising. Statistical
criteria, “what should work,” are widely used and valuable, but risky if applied narrowly. Relative track
records, “what has worked in this situation,” are expensive because they depend on conducting evaluation
studies. Guidelines from prior research, “what works in this type of situation,” relies on published research
and offers a low-cost, effective approach to selection. Using a systematic review of prior research, I
developed a flow chart to guide forecasters in selecting among ten forecasting methods. Some key
findings: Given enough data, quantitative methods are more accurate than judgmental methods. When
large changes are expected, causal methods are more accurate than naive methods. Simple methods are
preferable to complex methods; they are easier to understand, less expensive, and seldom less accurate.
To select a judgmental method, determine whether there are large changes, frequent forecasts, conflicts
among decision makers, and policy considerations. To select a quantitative method, consider the level of
knowledge about relationships, the amount of change involved, the type of data, the need for policy
analysis, and the extent of domain knowledge. When selection is difficult, combine forecasts from
different methods.
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Selecting Forecasting Methods
J. Scott Armstrong
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
ABSTRACT
I examined six ways of selecting forecasting methods: Convenience, “what’s easy,” is
inexpensive, but risky. Market popularity, “what others do,” sounds appealing but is unlikely to
be of value because popularity and success may not be related and because it overlooks some
methods. Structured judgment, “what experts advise,” which is to rate methods against
prespecified criteria, is promising. Statistical criteria, “what should work,” are widely used and
valuable, but risky if applied narrowly. Relative track records, “what has worked in this
situation,” are expensive because they depend on conducting evaluation studies. Guidelines from
prior research, “what works in this type of situation,” relies on published research and offers a
low-cost, effective approach to selection. Using a systematic review of prior research, I developed
a flow chart to guide forecasters in selecting among ten forecasting methods. Some key findings:
Given enough data, quantitative methods are more accurate than judgmental methods. When large
changes are expected, causal methods are more accurate than naive methods. Simple methods are
preferable to complex methods; they are easier to understand, less expensive, and seldom less
accurate. To select a judgmental method, determine whether there are large changes, frequent
forecasts, conflicts among decision makers, and policy considerations. To select a quantitative
method, consider the level of knowledge about relationships, the amount of change involved, the
type of data, the need for policy analysis, and the extent of domain knowledge. When selection is
difficult, combine forecasts from different methods.
KEYWORDS: Accuracy, analogies, combined forecasts, conjoint analysis, cross-sectional data,
econometric methods, experiments, expert systems, extrapolation, intentions, judgmental bootstrapping,
policy analysis, role playing, rule-based forecasting, structured judgment, track records, and time-series
data.

How should one select the best method for producing a forecast? Chambers, Mullick and Smith (1971) provided
answers with a fold-out chart. The chart, based on their opinions, had six descriptors down the first column that were
a mix of objectives and conditions (e.g., accuracy, applications, data required, and cost of forecasting). Across the
top, it had 18 forecasting techniques, some of which overlapped with others (e.g., regression, econometric methods).
During the following 17 years, the Harvard Business Review sold over 210,000 reprints of the article, making it one
of its most popular reprints. Chambers, Mullick and Smith (1974) expanded upon the article in a book. Since then,
much has been learned about selecting methods.
I examine six ways to select forecasting methods: convenience, market popularity, structured judgment,
statistical criteria, relative track records, and guidelines from prior research. These approaches can be used alone or
in combination. They may lead to the selection of more than one method for a given situation, in which case you
should consider combining forecasts.

CONVENIENCE
In many situations, it is not worth spending a lot of time to select a forecasting method. Sometimes little change is
expected, so different methods will yield similar forecasts. Or perhaps the economics of the situation indicate that
forecast errors are of little consequence. These situations are common.
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Convenience calls to mind the Law of the Hammer (give a child a hammer and he will find many things that
need to be pounded). There is a common presumption that researchers who are skilled at a technique will force their
technique on the problem at hand. Although this has not been studied by forecasters, related research by
psychologists, on selective perception, supports this viewpoint.
Convenience may lead to methods that are hard to understand. Statisticians, for example, sometimes use
Box-Jenkins procedures to forecast because they have been trained in their use, although decision makers may be
mystified. Also, a method selected by convenience may lead to large errors in situations that involve large changes.

MARKET POPULARITY
Market popularity involves determining what methods are used by other people or organizations. The assumptions
are that (1) over time, people figure out what methods work best, and (2) what is best for others will be best for you.
Surveys of usage offer only indirect evidence of success.
Dalrymple (1987), using a mail survey, obtained information about the usage of forecasting methods at 134
companies in the U.S. Exhibit 1 shows information from his study. He also cited other studies on the usage of salesforecasting methods and these contained similar findings.
Exhibit 1
Sales Forecasting Methods Used by Firms
Regularly Used
as Percentage
Expert Opinion
Internal
Sales force
Executives
External
Industry survey
Analogies
Leading indicators
Econometric
Multiple regression
Econometric methods

44.8
37.3
14.9
18.7

Regularly Used
as Percentage
Extrapolation
Naive
Moving average
Rate of change (percentage)
Rate of change (units)
Exponential smoothing
Regression against time
Box-Jenkins

30.6
20.9
19.4
15.7
11.2
6.0
3.7

12.7
11.9

Additional studies have been conducted since Dalrymple’s. Sanders and Manrodt (1994), for example,
found that while knowledge of quantitative methods seemed to be improving, firms still relied heavily on judgmental
methods.
Frank and McCollough (1992) surveyed 290 practitioners from the Finance Officers Association (for U.S.
state governments) in 1990. The most widely used forecasting method was judgment (82% of the respondents),
followed by trend lines (52%), regression (26%), moving averages (26%), and exponential smoothing (10%).
Rhyne (1989) examined forecasting practices at 40 hospitals by interviewing senior management.
Judgmental methods were commonly used: 87% reported using the ‘jury of executive opinion’ and 67.5% used
expert forecasts. Given the political nature of hospital forecasts, their use of judgmental methods would seem to
present serious problems with bias. For quantitative methods, 52.5% of the hospitals used moving averages, 12.5%
used exponential smoothing, and 35% used regression.
One of the problems with usage surveys is that forecasting techniques have not been clearly defined. For
example, what does “simple regression” mean? It might mean regression against time, but not all respondents would
use this definition.
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Another problem is that the conditions are not always described. This is difficult to do, and in fact,
researchers have rarely even requested such information. Dalrymple (1987) and Mentzer and Cox (1984) are among
the few who did. They examined methods that firms used for short-, medium-, and long-term sales forecasting (e.g.,
their respondents seldom used extrapolation for long-range forecasts), those used for industrial goods versus
consumers goods (e.g., industrial firms placed more reliance on sales-force opinions), and those used by small or
large firms (large firms used more quantitative methods). However, even these distinctions are too broad to be of
much use. Forecasters need to know specifics about the forecasting task, such as the methods firms use to forecast
new-product sales for consumer durables when at the concept phase, or how should one forecast competitor’s
actions?
Another limitation of usage studies is that they have not measured success. They measure only usage
(actually, they measure only perceived usage reported by people who would like to be regarded as good managers).
If firms do not conduct evaluations of alternative methods (and few do), usage offers a poor guide to what should be
done. Sometimes firms assume that methods are effective and use them widely even when they are of no value.
Certainly, usage is unrelated to efficacy in many cases. Forecasters use expert opinions even when ample evidence
exists that other methods are more accurate, as described for judgmental bootstrapping (Armstrong 2001b) and
econometric methods (Grove and Meehl 1996).
In some cases, what is done does not agree with experts’ belief about what should be done. Armstrong,
Brodie and McIntyre (1987) surveyed forecasting practitioners, marketing experts, and forecasting experts
concerning how to forecast competitors’ actions. What practitioners did differed from what marketing experts
recommended, which, in turn, differed from what forecasting experts preferred (Exhibit 2). For example,
practitioners seldom used game theory although almost half of the marketing experts thought it useful (few
forecasting experts agreed). Similarly, the use of role playing was minimal although it was one of the forecasting
experts’ highest-rated methods in this situation.
Exhibit 2
Usage Can be a Poor Guide to Selection of Forecasting Methods:
Percentages Using or Preferring Methods to Forecast Competitors’ Actions

Methods to Forecast Competitors’ Actions
Expert opinion (experts who know about the situation)
Extrapolation (statistical analysis of analogous situations)
Intentions (ask competitors)
Experimentation (try the strategy on a small scale)
Game theory (formal use of game theory)
Role-playing (formal acting out of the interactions involved)

% Usage
Practitioners
(n=59)
85
58
22
17
8
7

% Experts’ preferences
Marketing Forecasting
(n=15)
(n=18)
100
53
60
60
47
20

83
50
33
22
22
61

Finally, surveys have typically overlooked methods such as role playing, judgmental bootstrapping, conjoint
analysis, and expert systems. As a result, market popularity is the enemy of innovation.
STRUCTURED JUDGMENT
When a number of criteria are relevant and a number of methods are possible, structured judgment can help the
forecaster to select the best methods. In structured judgment, the forecaster first develops explicit criteria and then
rates various methods against them.
Evidence that structured judgments are superior to unstructured judgments has been found for many types
of selection problems. For example, in a review of research on the selection of job candidates, Campion, Palmer and
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Campion (1997) concluded “In the 80-year history of published research on employment interviewing, few
conclusions have been more widely supported than the idea that structuring the interview enhances reliability and
validity.”
 List the important criteria before evaluating methods.
Yokum and Armstrong (1995) summarized selection criteria that had been examined in earlier surveys by
Carbone and Armstrong (1982), Mahmoud, Rice and Malhotra (1986), Mentzer and Cox (1984), and Sanders and
Mandrodt (1994). They also reported findings from an expert survey of 94 researchers, 55 educators, 133
practitioners, and 40 decision makers. The results (Exhibit 3) were similar to those from the previous studies. The
earlier studies did not include the ability of the forecasting model to compare alternative policies, the ability to make
forecasts for alternative environments, and learning. Learning means that, as forecasters gain experience, they
improve their forecasting procedures.

Exhibit 3
Criteria for Selecting a Forecasting Technique
(scale: 1 unimportant to 7 unimportant)

Researcher
(94)

Criteria

Accuracy
Timeliness in providing forecasts
Cost savings resulting from improved decisions
Ease of interpretation
Flexibility
Ease in using available data
Ease of use
Ease of implementation
Incorporating judgmental input
Reliability of confidence intervals
Development cost (computer, human resources)
Maintenance cost (data storage, modifications)
Theoretical relevance
Ability to compare alternative policies
Ability to examine alternative environments
Learning

6.39
5.87
5.89
5.54
5.54
5.59
5.47
5.24
4.98
5.09
4.70
4.71
4.81
–
–
–

Mean Importance Rating
(number responding)
Decision
Educator Practitioner
Maker
(55)
(133)
(40)
6.09
5.82
5.66
5.89
5.35
5.52
5.77
5.55
5.12
4.70
5.02
4.75
4.20
–
–
–

6.10
5.92
5.62
5.67
5.63
5.44
5.39
5.36
5.19
4.81
4.83
4.73
4.43
–
–
–

6.20
5.97
5.97
5.82
5.85
5.79
5.84
5.80
5.15
5.05
5.10
4.72
3.72
–
–
–

Average
(322)
6.20
5.89
5.75
5.69
5.58
5.54
5.54
5.41
5.11
4.90
4.86
4.73
4.40
–
–
–

Decision makers, practitioners, educators, and researchers had similar views on the importance of various
criteria as seen in Exhibit 3. The average rank correlation among these groups is .9.
All the surveys showed that accuracy is the most important criterion. Mentzer and Kahn (1995), in a survey
of 207 forecasting executives, found that accuracy was rated important by 92% of the respondents. However, the
relative importance of the various criteria depends upon the situation. The importance ratings varied for short versus
long series, whether many or few forecasts were needed, and whether econometric or extrapolation methods were
involved. For example, for forecasts involving policy interventions, the experts in Yokum and Armstrong’s (1995)
survey rated cost savings from improved decisions as the most important criterion.


Assess the method’s acceptability and understandability to users.
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Although most academic studies focus on accuracy, findings from previous surveys indicate that ease of
interpretation and case of use are considered to be nearly as important as accuracy (see Exhibit 3). It does little good
to propose an accurate method that will be rejected or misused by people in an organization. Confidential surveys of
users can help to assess the acceptability and understandability of various methods.


Ask unbiased experts to rate potential methods.

To find the most appropriate methods, you should ask a number of experts to rate various forecasting
methods. The experts should have good knowledge of the forecasting methods and should have no reason to be
biased in favor of any method. The experts also should be familiar with the specific forecasting situation. If outside
experts are used, they should be given written descriptions of the situation. This would aid them in making their
evaluations and will provide a historical record for future evaluations. Formal ratings should be obtained
independently from each expert. The Delphi procedure (Rowe and Wright 2001) provides a useful way of obtaining
such ratings.

STATISTICAL CRITERIA
Statisticians rely heavily upon whether a method meets statistical criteria, such as the distribution of errors, statistical
significance of relationships, or the Durbin-Watson statistic. As noted by Cox and Loomis (2001), authors of
forecasting textbooks recommend the use of such criteria.
Statistical criteria are not appropriate for making comparisons among substantially different methods. They
would be of little use to someone trying to choose between judgmental and quantitative methods, or among role
playing, expert forecasts, and conjoint analysis. Statistical criteria are useful for selection only after the decision has
been made about the general type of forecasting method, and even then their use has been confined primarily to
quantitative methods.
Using statistical criteria for selection has other limitations. First, the criteria are usually absolute. Thus, the
search for methods that are statistically significant can lead analysts to overlook other criteria and to ignore domain
knowledge. Slovic and McPhillamy (1974) showed that when subjects were asked to choose between two
alternatives, they often depended on a cue that was common to both alternatives and that was precisely measured,
even when they recognized that this cue was irrelevant. Second, the rules are arbitrary in that they have no obvious
relationship to decision making. They concern statistical significance, not practical significance.
Despite these problems, forecasters often use statistical criteria to select methods. This approach seems to
be useful in some situations. For example, in extrapolation, statistical tests have helped forecasters to determine
whether they should use seasonal factors and whether they should use a method that dampens trends. Judging from
the M3-competition, statistical selection rules have been successfully employed for extrapolation. They can also help
to select from among a set of econometric models (Allen and Fildes 2001).

RELATIVE TRACK RECORDS
The relative track record is the comparative performance of various methods as assessed by procedures that are
systematic, unbiased, and reliable. It does not have to do with forecasting methods being used for a long time and
people’s satisfaction with them.


Compare the track records of various forecasting methods.

Informal impressions often lead to different conclusions than those based on formal assessments. For
example, most people believe that experts can predict changes in the stock market. Cowles (1933) examined 225
editorials by Hamilton, an editor for the Wall Street Journal who had gained a reputation as a successful forecaster.
From 1902 to 1929, Hamilton forecasted 90 changes in the stock market; he was correct half the time and wrong the
other half. Similar studies have followed in the stock market and related areas. Sherden’s (1998, Chapter 4) analysis
shows that the poor forecasting record of financial experts continues.
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Assessing the track record is an appealing way to select methods because it eliminates the need to
generalize from other research. The primary difficulty is that organizations seldom use good procedures for
evaluating methods (Armstrong 2001a discusses these procedures). As a result, people have trouble distinguishing
between a good track record and a good story.
Even if well designed, assessments of track records are based on the assumption that historical results can
be generalized to the future. This can be risky, especially if the historical period has been stable, and the future
situation is expected to be turbulent. To reduce risk, the analyst should assess the track record over a long time
period. A longer history will provide more reliable estimates.
Few studies have been done on the value of using track records for selecting forecasting methods. The two
studies that I found indicate that such assessments are useful.
Makridakis (1990) used the 111 series from the M-competition; these included annual, quarterly, and
monthly data. He compared four methods: exponential smoothing with no trend, Holt’s exponential smoothing with
trend, damped trend exponential smoothing, and a long-memory autoregressive model. He deseasonalized the data
when necessary. He compared the ex ante forecast errors on a holdout sample by using successive updating. For each
series, he then used the model with the lowest MAPE for a given forecast horizon to forecast for a subsequent
holdout sample. When methods were similar in forecast accuracy, Makridakis combined their forecasts. The
accuracy of this procedure of selecting models based on horizon length accuracy was better than that achieved by the
typical method (i.e., selecting a single model for all horizons). On average, it was a bit more accurate than equalweights combining of forecasts.
Is it better to find the most accurate model for all series in a type (an aggregate selection strategy), or should
one examine the track record for each series (individual selection)? To address this, Fildes (1989) examined data
from a single organization. The series represented the number of telephone lines in use in each of 263 localities. He
used two forecasting methods: Holt’s exponential smoothing with an adjustment for large shifts, and a robust trend
estimate. In making a robust trend estimate, one takes the median of the first differences (in this study an adjustment
was also made for outliers). Fildes calibrated models on periods 1 to 24. He then used successive updating to make
ex ante forecasts over periods 25 to 48. He used the error measures for this period as the basis for selection. He
conducted a validation for periods 49 through 70. The strategies had similar accuracy for short-range forecasts (from
one to six periods into the future). For longer-range forecasts (12- months-ahead), the error from aggregate selection
was about six percent higher than that for individual selection. However, individual selection did no better than a
combined forecast.
In the above comparisons, Makridakis and Fildes focused on accuracy. It would be useful to assess other
criteria, such as the understandability and acceptability of each method. Another limitation is that these studies
concern only extrapolation methods. I would expect track records to be especially useful when selecting from among
substantially different methods.

PRINCIPLES FROM PUBLISHED RESEARCH
Assume that you needed to forecast personal computer sales in China over the next ten years. To determine which
forecasting methods to use, you might use methods that have worked well in similar situations in the past. Having
decided on this approach, you must consider: (1) How similar were the previous situations to the current one? (You
would be unlikely to find comparative studies of forecasts of computer sales, much less computer sales in China), (2)
Were the leading methods compared in earlier studies? (3) Were the evaluations unbiased? (4) Were the findings
reliable? (5) Did these researchers examine the types of situations that might be encountered in the future? and (6)
Did they compare enough forecasts?
Georgoff and Murdick (1986) made an early attempt to develop research-based guidelines for selection.
They used 16 criteria to rate 20 methods. However, they cited only ten empirical studies. Because they were offering
advice for a matrix with 320 cells, they depended primarily upon their opinions.
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An extensive body of research is available for developing principles for selecting forecasting methods. The
principles are relevant to the extent that the current situation is similar to those examined in the published research.
Use of this approach is fairly simple and inexpensive.

General Principles
I examine some general principles from published research prior to discussing principles for various methods. The
general principles are to use methods that are (1) structured, (2) quantitative, (3) causal, (4) and simple. I then
examine how to match the forecasting methods to the situation.


Use structured rather than unstructured forecasting methods

You cannot avoid judgment. However, when judgment is needed, you should use it in a structured way. For
example, to forecast sales for a completely new product, you might use Delphi or intentions studies. Structured
forecasting methods tend to be more accurate than unstructured ones. They are also easier to communicate and to
replicate, and they aid learning, so the method can be improved over time.


Use quantitative methods rather than judgmental methods, if enough data exist.

If no data exist, use judgmental methods. But when enough data exist, quantitative methods are expected to
be more accurate. It is not always clear how much data is enough. This depends on the source, amount, relevance,
variability, reliability, and validity of the data. The research to date offers little guidance. Studies such as the
following would be useful; In a laboratory study on the time that groups took to assemble an Erector Set, Bailey and
Gupta (1999) compared predictions made by 77 subjects against those from two quantitative learning-curve models.
Bailey and Gupta provided data on the first two, four, six, or eight trials, and made predictions for the next three.
Judgmental predictions were more accurate than quantitative methods given two or four observations. There was
little difference given six observations. The quantitative approaches were more accurate than judgment when eight
observations were available.
When sufficient data exist on the dependent variable and on explanatory variables, quantitative methods can
be expected to be more accurate than judgmental methods. At worst, they seem to be as accurate. Few people believe
this finding. There are some limiting conditions, but they are not that serious: First, the forecaster must be reasonably
competent in using quantitative methods. Second, the methods should be fairly simple.
How can I make such a claim? The story goes back at least to Freyd (1925), who made a theoretical case
that statistical procedures should be more accurate than judgmental procedures. Sarbin (1943) tested this in a study
predicting the academic success of 162 college freshmen and found quantitative methods to be more accurate than
judgmental forecasts. He thought that he had made a convincing case, and wrote:
“Any jury sitting in judgment on the case of clinical [judgmental] versus actuarial
[statistical] methods must, on the basis of efficiency and economy, declare
overwhelmingly in favor of the statistical method for predicting academic achievement.”
That was not the end of the story. Researchers questioned whether the findings would generalize to other
situations. Paul Meehl published a series of influential studies on quantitative versus judgmental forecasting (e.g.,
Meehl 1954) and these extended Sarbin’s conclusion to other situations. In a more recent review, Grove and Meehl
(1996) said it was difficult to find studies that showed judges to be more accurate than quantitative models. The
results are consistent with those from judgmental bootstrapping (Armstrong 2001b) and expert systems (Collopy,
Adya and Armstrong 2001). Despite much research evidence, practitioners still ignore the findings. As shown by
Ahlburg (1991) and Dakin and Armstrong (1989), they even continue to rely on judgment for personnel predictions,
the subject of much of this research.
The above studies concern cross-sectional predictions. Evidence from time series identifies some conditions
under which judgmental methods are more accurate than quantitative methods. As with cross-sectional data,
quantitative methods are likely to show the greatest accuracy when large changes are involved or many data are
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available, but this is not so with few data. I summarized 27 empirical studies where few data were available and the
expected changes were small (Armstrong 1985, pp. 393-400): Judgment was more accurate than quantitative
methods in 17 studies, equally accurate in three studies, and less accurate in seven studies.
When you have enough data, then, use a quantitative method. This does not mean that one must avoid
judgment. Indeed, you often need judgment as part of the process, for example, providing inputs or deciding which
quantitative procedures to use.


Use causal rather than naive methods, especially if changes are expected to be large.

Naive methods often give adequate results, and they are typically inexpensive. Thus, extrapolation methods
may be appropriate for short-term inventory-control forecasts of products with long histories of stable demand. They
are less effective in situations where there are substantial changes.
Causal methods, if well structured and simple, can be expected to be at least as accurate as naive methods.
A summary of the evidence (Armstrong 1985, Exhibit 15-6), showed that causal methods were more accurate than
naive methods in situations involving small changes in nine comparative studies, the same in six, and less accurate in
six. But, for long-term forecasts (large changes), all seven studies showed that causal methods were more accurate.
Allen and Fildes (2001) extended the analysis and found that causal methods were more accurate than extrapolations
for short-term forecasts for 34 studies and less accurate for 21 (using the ex ante forecast error for “short” and
“short/medium” from their Table A4 found at the forecasting principles website, hops.wharton/upenn.edu/forecast).
For their “medium” and “medium-long” forecasts, causal methods were more accurate for 58 studies and less
accurate for 20.
Does this principle hold up in practice? Bretschneider et al. (1989) obtained information on 106 sales tax
forecasts and 74 total revenue forecasts from state governments in the U.S. These were one-year ahead annual
forecasts for 1975-85 from 28 states that responded to a survey. States using quantitative methods had smaller errors
than states using judgmental methods.


Use simple methods unless substantial evidence exists that complexity helps.

Use simple methods unless a strong case can be made for complexity. One of the most enduring and useful
conclusions from research on forecasting is that simple methods are generally as accurate as complex methods.
Evidence relevant to the issue of simplicity comes from studies of judgment (Armstrong 1985, pp. 96-105),
extrapolation (Armstrong 1984, Makridakis et al. 1982, and Schnaars 1984), and econometric methods (Allen and
Fildes 2001). Simplicity also aids decision makers’ understanding and implementation, reduces the likelihood of
mistakes, and is less expensive.
Simplicity in an econometric model would mean a small number of causal variables and a functional form
that is linear in its parameters (e.g., an additive model or a log-log model). For extrapolation, it might mean nothing
more complex than exponential smoothing with seasonally adjusted data. For role-playing, it would mean brief
sessions based on short role descriptions. An operational definition of simple is that the approach can be explained to
a manager so clearly that he could then explain it to others.
In his review of population forecasting, Smith (1997) concluded that simple methods are as accurate as
complex methods. In their review of research on tourism forecasting, Witt and Witt (1995) concluded that the naive
(no-change) model is typically more accurate than other procedures, such as commercially produced econometric
models. The value of simplicity shows up in practice; in a survey on the accuracy of U.S. government revenue
forecasts, states that used simple econometric methods reported substantially lower MAPEs than those that used
complex econometric methods (Bretschneider et al. 1989).
Nevertheless, some complexity may help when the forecaster has good knowledge of the situation. Simple
econometric methods are often more accurate than extrapolations (Allen and Fildes 2001, Tables A5, A6 and A7 on
the forecasting principles website). Decomposed judgments are often more accurate than global judgments
(MacGregor 2001). Exponential smoothing of trends is often more accurate than naive forecasts. In fact, many
forecasting principles call for added complexity. That said, forecasters often use overly complex methods.
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Complexity improves the ability to fit historical data (and it probably helps to get papers published), but it often
harms forecast accuracy.


Match the forecasting methods to the situation.

The above general principles were used, along with prior research, to develop more specific guidelines for
selecting methods based on the situation. They are described here, along with evidence, following the flow chart in
Exhibit 4.
Exhibit 4
Selection Tree for Forecasting Methods
Sufficient
Objective Data
No

Yes

(Judgmental)

(Quantitative)
Good
Knowledge of
Relationships

Large Changes
Expected
No

Yes

Expertise Expensive or
Repetitive Forecasts
No

No

Conflict Among a Few
Decision Makers

Yes

No

Yes

Cross-section

Similar
Cases Exist
No

No

Large
Changes
Expected

Type of
Data

Yes

Policy
Analysis

Yes

Yes

Yes

Good
Domain
Knowledge

Policy
Analysis
No

Best
Source

No

Time series

Yes

Yes

No

Experts Participants

Expert
Forecasting

Judgmental
Bootstrapping

Conjoint
Analysis

Intentions

Role
Playing

Analogies

Expert
Systems

Rule-based
Forecasting

ExtrapOlation

Econometric
Method

Different
Methods
Provide
Useful Forecasts
Use Selected Method

No

Yes

Combine Forecasts

Judgmental Methods
Starting with the judgmental side of the selection tree, the discussion proceeds downward, and then from left to right.
The selection of judgmental procedures depends on whether substantial deviations from a simple historical
projection are expected over the forecast horizon. When predicting for cross-sectional data, the selection of a method
depends on whether large differences are expected among the elements to be forecast; for example, the performances
of players selected by professional sports teams will vary enormously.
Small Changes: If the expected changes are not large, methods are likely to differ little in accuracy. Also
for infrequent forecasts, expert forecasts, which can be tailored to the situation and prepared quickly, may be
sufficient.
If many forecasts are needed, expert forecasts are likely to be too expensive. For example, the demand for
items in a sales catalogue or the success of job candidates require many forecasts. Judgmental bootstrapping is
appropriate in such cases. It can provide forecasts that are less expensive than those based on judgment because it
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applies the experts’ procedures in a mechanical way. In addition, bootstrapping will provide improvements in
accuracy.
Large Changes with No Conflicts: In some situations, you may expect large changes (moving to the right
in Exhibit 4). If decision makers in the situation are not in conflict, you can obtain forecasts from experts or
participants.
When decision makers need forecasts to examine different policies, they can obtain them from experts and
participants. Judgmental bootstrapping and conjoint analysis are well suited for this.
A company planning to sell computers in China might need forecasts to make decisions on pricing,
advertising, and design for a new product. Judgmental bootstrapping provides a low-cost way to examine a wide
range of policies. For example, experts could make forecasts for about 20 different marketing plans constructed
according to an experimental design. The model could then be used to predict responses to still other plans. The key
assumption behind judgmental bootstrapping is that the experts who provide inputs to the model understand the
situation. Judgmental bootstrapping is superior to expert forecasts in terms of accuracy (Armstrong 2001b). It also
provides consistent forecasts, which helps in comparing alternative policy options. In addition, judgmental
bootstrapping offers an opportunity to evaluate some policy variables that cannot be examined by conjoint analysis.
For example, what would happen to sales if a firm increased advertising for a particular product? An expert could
assess this, but not a prospective customer.
When experts lack experience to judge how customers will respond, it may help to seek information from
potential customers. Conjoint analysis can be used to develop a forecasting model based on how consumers respond
to alternative offerings. If the proposed product or service is new, they might not know how they would respond. But
if the alternatives are described realistically, they can probably predict their actions better than anyone else can.
Realistic descriptions can be done at a low cost (Armstrong and Overton 1971). As Wittink and Bergestuen (2001)
discuss, conjoint analysis offers a consistent way to evaluate alternatives and it improves forecast accuracy.
However, given the need for large samples, this can be expensive.
For important forecasts, you can use both judgmental bootstrapping and conjoint analysis. Their forecasts
for policy options might differ, in which case you gain information about forecast uncertainty. A combination of
forecasts from the two methods would likely improve accuracy and reduce the risk of large errors.
If there is no need to forecast for alternative policies, I recommend intentions studies. Present the issue and
ask people how they would respond. For example, this approach could be used to predict the vote for a referendum
to reduce taxes. Or, as Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) did, it could be used to predict how people would respond to
a plan to charge residents for each bag of garbage.
Expert forecasts can also be used to assess a proposed policy change. For example, in one project we asked
a sample of potential customers about their intentions to subscribe to a proposed urban mass transit system known as
the Minicar Mass Transit System (Armstrong and Overton 1971). As an alternative approach, we could have
described the system’s design and marketing plan to a group of, say, six mass-transportation experts, and asked them
to predict the percentage of the target market that would subscribe to the service over the next year. Such a survey of
experts would have been faster and cheaper than the intentions study.
Lemert (1986) asked 58 political experts to predict the outcomes of two referendums on the 1982 Oregon
ballot. One dealt with land-use planning and the other with property-tax limitations. Although the vote was nearly
tied in each case, the experts were usually correct (73.2% were correct on the first and 89.5% on the second).
Moreover, the mean prediction of the experts was close to the actual vote (off by 1.4% on the first issue and by 0.3%
on the second). But when Lemert obtained predictions from 283 voters, fewer were correct (63.3% and 61.4%
respectively). Of those who voted “yes” (averaging across the two issues), 70% expected the referendum would be
passed. Of those who voted “no,” 25% thought it would be passed. This study demonstrates that unbiased experts are
more accurate than participants in predicting the behavior of other people.
Some confusion exists about the use of intentions and expert opinions. Because experts forecast the
behavior of many people, you need only a few experts. Lewis-Beck and Tien (1999) exhibited this confusion. They
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compared the results of their surveys of voters’ intentions against another survey that asked voters to predict who
would win. In the latter case, the researchers used voters as experts. This was a poor strategy because most voters
lack adequate knowledge about others, and they are biased in favor of their candidates. Lewis-Beck and Tien
compensated for such bias by selecting representative probability samples. This required samples of from 1,000 to
2,000 each year, whereas a sample of ten unbiased political experts probably would have been adequate.
Large Changes with Conflicts: When considering situations with large changes, it is difficult to find
relevant analogies. For example, when Fred Smith started FedEx in the mid-1970s, the U.S. Post Office charged
$1.50 for mailing a special delivery letter. FedEx planned to provide a faster and more reliable service for $12.50.
Role-playing would have been useful to forecast competitors’ behavior. People could play roles as key executives at
FedEx, the U.S. Post Office, and perhaps UPS. They would be asked to respond to various plans FedEx was
considering. Role playing is more accurate than expert forecasts in situations in which two parties are in conflict with
each other (Armstrong 2001b).
Analogies can be useful. For instance, in trying to predict how legalization of drugs would affect the
number of users and crime rates, look to studies of the prohibition of alcohol in the U.S. and other countries. To
predict the sales of brand-name drugs a year after the introduction of generic drugs, generalize from previous
situations; according to the Wall Street Journal (Feb. 20, 1998, p. B5), brand-name drugs lose about 80% of their
dollar sales.
It can help to merely think about analogies and to consider how the current situation relates to them.
Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg (1988) asked 2,994 new entrepreneurs to estimate their perceived chances of success.
Eighty-one percent of them thought their odds were better than seven in ten. Interestingly, those who were poorly
prepared to run a business were just as optimistic as those who were better prepared. But when they were asked
“What are the odds of any business like yours succeeding,” only 39% thought the odds were better than seven in ten.
Based on studies reviewed by Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg, even this estimate exceeds the historical success rate of
entrepreneurs. Still, thinking about analogies could have led these entrepreneurs to more accurate forecasts.

Quantitative Methods
When you have enough objective data to use quantitative methods (the right-hand side of Exhibit 4), you may or may
not have good prior knowledge about future relationships. When you do not, the selection of an approach depends on
whether you have cross-sectional or time-series data.
Poor Knowledge of Relationships and Cross-sectional Data: If you lack knowledge of expected
relationships, and have cross-sectional data, ask whether you need to compare alternative policies. If not, experts can
use analogies as the basis for forecasts.
Use unbiased procedures to select a large sample of analogies. For example, in trying to predict whether a
campaign to introduce water fluoridation in a particular community in New Zealand will succeed, one could analyze
the many analogous cases in the U.S. This advice is often ignored. Consider the following case. Stewart and
Leschine (1986) discussed the use of analogies for the decision to establish an oil refinery in Eastport, Maine. The
Environmental Protection Agency had not used worldwide estimates of tanker spills, but instead relied on a single
analogy (Milford Haven in the U.K.) believing that it was a comparable site. The use of a single site is unreliable and
prone to bias. Analysts should have rated all ports for similarity without knowledge of their oil spill rates, selected
some of the most similar, and then examined spill rates.
Information from analogies can reduce the effects of potential biases because analogies provide objective
evidence. This was illustrated in Kahneman and Lovallo (1993). Kahneman had worked with a small team of
academics to design a new judgmental decision making curriculum for Israeli high schools. He circulated slips of
paper and asked each team member to predict the number of months it would take them to prepare a proposal for the
Ministry of Education. The estimates ranged from 18 to 30 months. Kahneman then turned to a member of the team
who had considerable experience developing new curricula. He asked him to think of analogous projects. The man
recalled that about 40% of the teams eventually gave up. Of those that completed the task, he said, none did so in
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less than seven years. Furthermore, he thought that the present team was probably below average in terms of
resources and potential. As it turned out, it took them eight years to finish the project.
Experiments by Buehler, Griffin and Ross (1994) supported Kahneman and Lovallo’s illustration. Their
subjects made more accurate predictions of the time they would take to do a computer assignment when they
described analogous tasks they had solved previously. Without the analogies, there were overly optimistic. The
subjects were even more accurate when they described how the current task related to analogous cases they had
experienced.
If no suitable analogies can be found, you might try to create them by conducting field or laboratory
experiments. Field experiments are more realistic. As a result, they are generally thought to provide more valid
forecasts. They are widely used in test marketing new products to predict future sales. On the negative side, field
experiments are subject to many threats to validity. Competitors may respond in test markets so as to distort the
forecasts and environmental changes may affect test results.
Laboratory experiments offer more control. Despite claims that they lack external validity and suffer from
what reviewers delightfully refer to as “demand effects” (subjects just responding to the demand of the experiment),
laboratory experiments are often useful for forecasting. More generally, Locke (1986), using a series of studies in
organizational behavior, showed that findings from laboratory experiments were generally similar to those from field
experiments.
The key is to design experiments, whether laboratory or field, so that they match the forecasting situation
reasonably well. For example, in a lab experiment designed to estimate price elasticities, Wright and Gendall (1999)
showed that it was important to at least provide a picture of the product and to consider only responses from
potential purchasers. Previous studies, in which researchers had not done this often produced inaccurate estimates.
Conjoint studies sometimes fail to provide adequate illustrations. The Internet provides a low-cost way to provide
realistic descriptions. Dahan and Srinivasan (2000), in a study of 11 different bicycle pumps, found that a web-based
descriptions were similar to physical prototypes in predicting market share. Web-based designs are much less
expensive than physical prototypes.
When people need to compare alternative policies, expert systems should be considered. They are especially
useful when the situation is complex and experts differ in their ability to forecast. An expert system should be based
on the processes used by those thought to be the best experts.
Judgmental bootstrapping is also relevant for comparing policies. You can infer rules by regressing the
experts’ predictions against actual data. Alternatively, you can infer the experts’ rules by asking them to make
predictions for fictitious (but realistic) cases. This latter approach is appropriate when historical values do not have
large variations and when the historical variations are not independent of one another.
The choice between expert systems and judgmental bootstrapping is likely to be based on costs and
complexity. Judgmental bootstrapping is less expensive, but it requires a great deal of simplification. If complexity is
needed and you have excellent domain knowledge, expert systems might enable the description of a well-structured
set of conditions that can improve forecast accuracy (Collopy, Adya and Armstrong 2001).
Poor Knowledge of Relationships and Time Series Data: Although you may lack good prior knowledge
of relationships, you may be able to obtain specific knowledge about a situation. For example, a manager may know
a lot about a product and this might help in preparing a sales forecast.
If good domain knowledge is available, rule-based forecasting is appropriate. Although it is more costly
than extrapolation, RBF tends to improve accuracy (versus pure extrapolation) because it uses domain knowledge
and because the rules tailor the extrapolation method to the situation (Armstrong, Adya and Collopy 2001).
Rule-based forecasting might also be appropriate if domain knowledge is not available. This is because it
applies guidelines from prior research. However, little research has been done to test this proposition. Still, its
accuracy was competitive with the best of well-established software programs when used for annual data in the M3competition (Adya, Armstrong, Collopy and Kennedy 2000).
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Extrapolation of time series is a sensible option if domain knowledge is lacking, the series is stable and
many forecasts are needed. These conditions often apply to forecasting for inventory control. I suspect, however, that
people have useful domain knowledge in most situations.
Good Knowledge of Relationships and Small Changes (far right of Exhibit 4): Knowledge of
relationships might be based on the judgment of experts who have received good feedback in previous comparable
situations or on the results of empirical studies. For example, in trying to predict the effects of alternative marketing
plans for a product, one might rely on the many studies of price and advertising elasticities, such as those
summarized by Tellis (1988), Assmus, Farley and Lehmann (1984), and Sethuraman and Tellis (1991).
When small changes are expected, knowledge about relationships is not of much value. Difficulties in
measurement and in forecasting changes in the causal variables are likely to negate the value of the additional
information. Thus, studies involving short-term forecasting show that extrapolation methods (which ignore causal
information) are often as accurate as econometric methods (Allen and Fildes 2001).
Expert forecasts can be expected to do well in these situations. In line with this expectation, Braun and
Yaniv (1992) found that economists were more accurate than quantitative models in estimating the level at time t
(when changes are small), as accurate in forecasting one-quarter-ahead forecasts, but less accurate for four-quartersahead.
0

Good Knowledge of Relationships and Large Changes: Use econometric methods when large changes
are expected. The evidence summarized by Allen and Fildes (2001) supports this advice.
In my study of the photographic market (Armstrong 1985, p. 411), where there was good knowledge of
relationships, I made six-year backcasts of camera sales, using the data from 1965 through 1960 to backcast for
1954. The data were put into three groups: six countries with moderate changes in sales, five with large changes, and
six with very large changes. For the six countries with moderate changes, the errors from an econometric model
averaged 81% of errors from a combined forecast based on no trend, the trend for that country, and the trend for all
17 countries. For five countries with large changes, the errors averaged 73% of the combined extrapolations, and for
five countries with very large changes, they were 32%. As hypothesized, econometric methods were relatively more
accurate than trend extrapolation when change was largest. This study was limited because it used actual changes
(not expected changes) in the dependent variable.
A study of the air travel market (Armstrong and Grohman 1972) also showed the value of econometric
methods to be greater when large changes were expected. This was an ideal situation for econometric models
because there was good prior knowledge and ample data. Analysts at the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) had
published judgmental forecasts for the U.S. market. They had access to all of the knowledge and used quantitative
methods as inputs to their judgmental forecasts. Armstrong and Grohman (1972) examined forecasts for 1963 to
1968 using successive updating. In this case, the expected change was based simply on the length of the forecast
horizon; more change being expected in the long-run. As shown in Exhibit 5, the econometric forecasts were more
accurate than the FAA’s judgmental forecasts and this gain became greater as the horizon increased.
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Exhibit 5
Accuracy of Econometric Models in an Ideal Situation: U.S. Air Travel
Mean Absolute Percentage Errors
Forecast
Horizon
(years)

Number
of
Forecasts

Judgment
by FAA

Econometric
Model

Error
Reduction

1
2
3
4
5
6

6
5
4
3
2
1

6.8
15.6
25.1
34.1
42.1
45.0

4.2
6.8
7.3
9.8
6.2
0.7

2.6
8.8
17.8
24.3
35.9
44.3

Besides improving accuracy, econometric methods allow you to compare alternative policies. Furthermore,
they can be improved as you gain knowledge about the situation.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
First consider what not to do. Do not select methods based on convenience, except for stable situations with little
change and where accuracy is not critical.
The popularity of a method does not indicate its effectiveness. It provides little information about the
performance of the methods and about the situations in which they are used. Furthermore, forecasters may overlook
relevant methods.
Structured judgment is valuable, especially if ratings by forecasting experts are used. First develop criteria,
and then ask experts for formal (written) ratings of how various methods meet those criteria.
Statistical criteria are important and should become more useful as researchers examine how they relate to
accuracy. Still, some statistical criteria are irrelevant or misleading. Furthermore, statistical criteria may lead analysts
to overlook relevant criteria.
When large changes are expected and errors have serious consequences, you can assess the track record of
leading forecasting methods in the given situation. While useful and convincing, comparing the accuracy of various
methods is expensive and time-consuming.
Drawing upon extensive research, we developed guidelines to help practitioners decide which methods are
appropriate for their situations. Through these guidelines, one can select methods rapidly and inexpensively. If a
number of methods are promising, use them and combine their forecasts (Armstrong 2001c).

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCHERS
To assess market popularity, you would need to learn about a method’s performance relative to other methods. The
type of research by Bretschneider et al. (1989) is promising. They used survey data from state government agencies.
Respondents described their revenue forecasting methods and reported actual values. Bretschneider et al. correlated
the forecasting methods they used with their forecast errors. Studies of market popularity should also identify the
conditions (e.g., were large changes expected? Was there high uncertainty?). The survey should go beyond “use” to
consider “satisfaction” and “performance.”
Do structured procedures help analysts to select good forecasting methods? The evidence I have cited did
not come from studies on forecasting, so it would be worthwhile to directly examine the value of structured
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procedures for selecting forecasting methods. For example, you could use situations for which researchers have
identified the best methods, but you would not reveal this to the forecasters. The question is whether, given a
description of the current situation, forecasters who follow a structured approach would make a better selection of
forecasting methods than forecasters with similar experience who do not use a structured approach.
Statistical criteria have been assumed to be useful. However, little research has been done to examine the
effectiveness of statistical criteria. Comparative studies are needed. The M-competitions do not meet the need
because the various methods differ in many ways. Thus one cannot determine which aspects of the methods are
effective under various conditions.
I was able to find only two studies that assessed the use of relative track records for selection. This should be a
fertile area for further research.
Research that contributes to the development and refinement of guidelines for selection is always useful. Such
findings can be easily applied to the selection of forecasting methods if the conditions are well defined.

CONCLUSIONS
I described six approaches for selecting forecasting methods. Convenience and market popularity, while often used,
are not recommended. Structured judgment, statistical criteria, and track records can all help in selecting and can be
used in conjunction with one another. Guidelines from prior research are particularly useful for selecting forecasting
methods. They offer a low-cost way to benefit from findings based on expert judgments and on over half a century of
research on forecasting.
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